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THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN’S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
SECURITY DIPLOMACY:  TOWARDS A “NORMAL” COUNTRY?
This article offers an alternative perspective of Japan’s international 
human security diplomacy concerning the underlying motivations 
that has caused Japan to pursue its international human security 
diplomacy in such proactive and aggressive manner. So far Japan’s 
involvement in the international human security initiatives had only 
been examined separately in the literature, with not much attention 
been given towards it linkage with Japan’s relentless efforts and 
restraints throughout the decades towards becoming a normal state. 
This article argues that when Japan’s involvement in international 
human security is studied together with its underlying ambition 
of becoming a normal state, the approach can no longer be solely 
understood as Japan’s effort to compensate the imbalances between 
its reactive international political posture and its significant status as 
the world’s third-biggest economy. Instead, this involvement should 
be examined from the perspective of Japan’s own national security 
requirements. Most importantly, it should be examined alongside 
Japan’s effort to strategically participate, contribute, and gain greater 
autonomy in the international political sphere under its envisioned 
status as a normal country. From this perspective, the motivation 
behind Japan’s persistence and aggressive pursuit of its international 
human security diplomacy becomes clearer under Prime Minister 
Abe’s “proactive contribution to peace”. It implies a shift in Japan’s 
security identity from a ‘peace state’ to an ‘international state’ that 
sees Japan playing a more active role in responding to the structural 
changes of the international security environment. In particular, 
it corresponds with Japan’s effort under the Abe administration to 
inculcate worldwide awareness that becoming a “normal state” 
is a prerequisite for Japan to collaborate with the international 
community and contribute effectively towards sustainable world 
peace and stability.
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Introduction
Since the introduction of the human security concept by the United Nations 
in 1994, Japan has been a staunch champion of the cause, taking proactive 
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steps towards operationalizing the human security concept internationally. 
This article looks back at the origin of Japan’s international human security 
diplomacy and how the human security approach persists as a pillar in 
Japan’s foreign policy. It argues that the aggressive involvement of Japan’s 
international effort in promoting human security is the answer to the lacunae 
in Japan’s ambition of becoming a normal state. Additionally, this article 
views that Japan’s approach to human security should be understood from 
the context of Japan’s own national security requirements; as well as its 
quest to strategically participate, contribute, and gain greater autonomy in the 
international political sphere. From Japan’s point of view, this could only be 
implemented effectively under its envisioned status as a normal country. With 
the increasing global dimensions infused into its foreign policy as a result of 
Japan’s active involvement in its international human security diplomacy, 
Japan could articulate its global vision and objectives at the international 
arena, and demonstrate its leadership that commensurate with its national 
stature. This continuous effort would, over time, justify Japan’s aspiration 
towards becoming a normal state, occupying an “honored place”in the 
international community. This article is organized into four parts. The first part 
introduces the background of Japan and human security. Meanwhile, Japan’s 
International Human Security Diplomacy such as the motivations towards 
international human security diplomacy, war guilt and gestures of atonement, 
shaping a favorable geostrategic environment, threat perceptions, UN doctrine 
on the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) and domestic political intervention is 
covered in the second part. The third part analyzes Japan’s efforts in gaining 
international trust as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace”. Finally, part four 
concludes the discussion and provides some suggestions in Japan’s way 
forward towards becoming a ‘normal country’.
Japan and Human Security
Since the end of World War II, the concept of security has been highly pursued 
in the effort to raise the possibility of non-violent change in international 
relations. According to Wolfers, security measures the absence of threats to 
acquired values and the absence of fear that such values will be attacked. While 
elusive and open to many interpretations, the most noticeable characteristics of 
the term security in the international relations theory are its identification with 
national security. This could be seen in the narrow sense of military strategy 
dominated by the realist perspective that has been built upon the premise of 
relationships among nations. In this context, security studies in international 
relations theory are closely related to military security.
Nevertheless, the collapse of the Cold War system based on the balance 
of fear between two superpowers has further lessened the sense of imminent 
danger due to a nuclear confrontation. As a result, other security concerns such 
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as transnational terrorism, massive population movements, infectious diseases, 
and threats to the earth’s environment, have become more crucial. State-centric 
(or politico/military-centric) view of security alone is no longer effective in 
dealing with the global issues that surpass the territorial boundaries of states. 
In this regard, Buzan1have presented a different view regarding security that is 
referred to as “peace studies”, rather than realism-oriented “security studies” 
that were far too “war-prone”. Although the central theme of his argument 
is the pursuit of freedom from threat by a state, Buzan is of the view that 
the security of human collectivities is affected by factors in five major areas 
namely; military, political, economic, societal, and environmental.
Buzan’s approach towards what he termed “common security” 
is based on the belief that no country can increase its own security without 
increasing the security of other countries at the same time. Similarly, the 1982 
Report of the United Nations Independent Commission on Disarmament and 
Security Issues (UNICDSI) of the United Nations Office for Disarmament 
Affairs (UNODA) proclaimed that “… a doctrine of common security must 
replace the present expedient of deterrence through armaments. International 
peace must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than a threat of mutual 
destruction”. Porter & Brown2further complimented this view by emphasizing 
that the main threats to global security come not from individual states but 
from global problems shared by the global community.
This broadening of the scope and domain of the concept of common 
security by Buzan as well as Porter & Brown paved the way for a clearer 
definition of human security. According to the Commission on Human Security 
(CHS) of the United Nations, the definition of human security is “…to protect 
the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and 
human fulfillment … protecting fundamental freedoms … that are the essence 
of life … protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) 
threats and situations … using processes that build on people’s strengths and 
aspirations … creating political, social, environmental, economic, military 
and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, 
livelihood and dignity”.3It re-conceptualizes security in a fundamental way 
by concentrating on the security of the individuals and their protection and 
empowerment, moving away from the state-centric conceptions of security 
that focused primarily on the safety of states from military aggression. It also 
draws attention to a multitude of threats that cut across different aspects of 
human life while highlighting the interface between security, development, and 
human rights. At the same time, human security promotes a newly integrated, 
coordinated, and people-centered approach to advancing peace, security and 
development within and across nations.
When the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) introduced 
the concept of “human security” for the first time in 1994, Japan was one of 
the countries that supported the new idea. A year later in 1995, in his speech 
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at the Special Commemorative Meeting of the 50th anniversary of the United 
Nations General Assembly, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama endorsed 
human security as an important idea for the UN. This made him one of the 
first heads of states to endorse the idea.4Subsequently, in 1998, Prime Minister 
Keizo Obuchi further pushed the human security concept to the forefront of 
Japan’s foreign policy by pledging approximately USD30 billion in aids to 
countries hit by the Asian financial crisis.
Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori continued the progress made by Obuchi 
by jointly establishing and financing the United Nations Trust Fund for Human 
Security (UNTFHS) with the UN. This fund supports the implementation 
of human security projects focusing on the Lowest of the Least Developed 
Countries to help fill the gapbetween humanitarian and development 
assistance.5In addition to the UNTFHS, Japan also helped establish the 
Commission on Human Security (CHS) in 2001 to further develop the human 
security concept and recommend techniques for its practical application. In 
2003, Japan revised the Charter of its Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
for the first time since the ODA Charter was adopted in 1992. The new Charter 
pledged to contribute to peace and development of the international community 
in accordance with the UN human security guidelines, as well as to help ensure 
Japan’s own security and prosperity.
Japan’s financial contribution towards the international development 
agenda began even as early as 1954 when it joined the Colombo Plan for 
Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific. In 
October 1954, Japan signed the Japan-Burma Peace Treaty and Agreement 
on Reparations and Economic Cooperation, followed by the succession of 
reparations treaties signed with the Philippines, Indonesia, and the Republic 
of Vietnam (South Vietnam). Subsequently, Japan also extended grant aid to 
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Micronesia, 
as well as its first yen loan to India in 1958. Japan’s financial assistance which 
began with providing reparations and economic cooperation to Asian countries 
combined with an emphasis on providing cooperation towards those that have 
close links with Japan, has lifted Japan’s image in the eyes of the countries in 
the region. This commensurate well with its considerable economic power as 
the second biggest economy after the U.S. during that period.
Nonetheless, Japan’s active involvement in championing the 
international human security framework along with its ODA6 effort is puzzling. 
Why did Japan, a country cynically regarded as a political and military 
“pygmy” as well as a “reactive”7 state in term of its foreign affairs approach; 
pursue human security so aggressively? Japan’s effort in championing the 
cause of international human security is also baffling as it was initiated during 
a time when the nation was facing its worst financial crisis vis-à-vis the “Lost 
Decade” (1991-2000), and the subsequent prolonged stagnation of its economy 
for another decade thereafter. In addition, Japan’s international human security 
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diplomacy is not even a top priority under the foreign policy underlined by the 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.8 Instead, human security has been placed 
as its fourth priority under the theme of tackling global issues.
A closer look into the existing literature on Japan’s human security 
involvement reveals that most of the studies revolve mainly around the 
theoretical conception of, and approach towards human security. In most cases, 
Japan would be singled out as the perfect example of the differencing approach 
between the East and the West, in term of scope, core values, and their focus, 
with Canada as the representation of the West.9 Japan’s approach would 
usually reflect the promotion of intellectual dialog, development assistance and 
conflict prevention, while Canada’s approach favors humanitarian intervention 
with greater emphasis on human rights.10In most cases, Japan’s involvement 
in human security initiatives has been treated as a given, without a thorough 
discussion over its final destination.11 In short, the bulk of the literature on 
Japan’s involvement in human security is mainly theoretical, missing the 
effort to examine the reason for Japan’s involvement with human security in 
the first place. Nevertheless, the work of comes close to this article’s context 
when it stated that Japan’s active participation in the human security initiatives 
would allow it to not only play a more active political role but also to avoid 
being branded as an aspiring military power by its domestic and international 
critics.12 It, however, leaves the matter open-ended without further examining 
the end purpose of Japan in doing so. It thus provided a gap for this article to 
explore the relation between the aggressive pursuits of Japan’s international 
human security diplomacy and its relentless efforts throughout the decades 
towards becoming a normal state.
To this end, this article seeks to address the gap by identifying the 
factors that drive Japan’s motivation towards its active participation in the 
international human security initiatives despite the constraints of its pacifist 
constitution and financial limitations. It emphasizes the limit of Japan’s 
security approaches under the restraint of its pacifism in coping with the new 
threats and issues brought about by the structural changes of the contemporary 
geo-strategic environment as the main reason for Japan to participate actively 
in the international human security initiatives. The concept of human security 
itself is very attractive to Japan as it enables the international community to be 
amenable to Japan assuming a more proactive role in the areas of multilateral 
security dialogues, peacekeeping missions, disaster relief provision, combating 
piracy, et cetera at the global stage. Pursuing human security provides a 
stronger case for Japan to justify its efforts towards becoming a normal state 
not only from the viewpoint of its own national security but also its ability 
to cooperate effectively with the international community towards achieving 
world peace and stability.
In order to effectively explain this argument, this article will be 
structured into three parts; the first part, the introduction; briefly elaborates 
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the problem statement of this article. The second part analyzes the interplay 
of structural and domestic factors that motivated the development of Japan’s 
active and assertive approach to international human security diplomacy. 
Finally, the third part sums up the finding over this article’s assumption that 
the diversification of Japan’s international human security diplomacy under 
Abe’s new security orientation is the process that would lead Japan towards 
becoming a normal state.13
Japan’s International Human Security Diplomacy
There are several important aspects in discussing Japan’s international 
human security diplomacy. These include the country’s motivations towards 
international human security diplomacy, war guilt and gestures of atonement, 
shaping a favorable geostrategic environment, threat perceptions, the UN 
doctrine on the R2P and domestic political intervention.
World War II left Japan completely devastated and facing an urgent 
need for economic and societal rehabilitation. The military alliance with and 
the crucial contribution made by the U.S. toward the reconstruction of Japan 
is the foundation of Japan’s foreign and security policy. Under the security 
umbrella provided by the U.S., Japan is able to ensure peace and exercise 
democracy, focusing on its economic recovery and development without 
the need for any large-scale military rearmament. Under this condition, 
Japan emerged to become the world’s second-biggest economy in the 1960s. 
Nevertheless, the most conspicuous development within the psyche of every 
Japanese people throughout the period since 1945 is the growing characteristic 
of its anti-military norm and principles within the society.14It shaped Japan’s 
foreign policy towards peaceful means, such as foreign aid and investment, 
and cooperation in the civilian and non-military sphere of action.
Japan approaches its security from a broader perspective out of the 
traditional military dimension. It includes social, economic and political aspects 
in achieving its national security objectives.15The low priority given to military 
security in favor of a more comprehensive security policy was underpinned 
by the non-acceptance of the use of military force as a legitimate instrument 
of statecraft and a commitment to non-possession of war potential, which was 
incorporated in the post-war pacifist Constitution of 1947 through Article 9. It 
gave birth to Japan’s concept of human security that “comprehensively covers 
all the menaces that threaten human survival, daily life, and dignity—for 
example, environmental degradation, violations of human rights, transnational 
organized crime, illicit drugs, refugees, poverty, anti-personnel landmines 
and...infectious diseases such as AIDS—and strengthens efforts to confront 
these threats”.16
The concept of human security emerged as a response to a series of 
new security challenges and threats associated with the post-Cold War period. 
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However, in the case of Japan, the awareness that sparked the nation’s vision of 
human security could be traced back to the condition of Japan during the post-
World War II period. It reflects the Japanese people’s renouncement of war 
and its determination not to allow the reoccurrence of the suffering that they 
had endured during that difficult period. The regret, however, mainly revolves 
around the recognition that the suffering was due to their own deed, namely 
Japan’s past militarism and the war crimes committed against the people in the 
Asia Pacific region. The feeling of deep remorse and guilt led Japan to start 
its war reparation efforts pursuant to the San Francisco Peace Treaty involving 
reparations to the Philippines (USD550 million) and Vietnam (USD39 million), 
payment to the International Committee of the Red Cross to compensate 
prisoners of war (4.5 million pound sterling), and the relinquishing of Japan’s 
overseas assets (USD23.7 billion). In addition, war reparations made pursuant 
to individual peace treaties and other treaties were been extended to Burma 
(USD200 million) and Indonesia (USD223 million); whereas under the Japan-
Soviet Union Joint Declaration (1956), both countries waived all reparations 
claims arising from the war.
Aside from war reparations, Japan joined the Colombo Plan on 6 
October 1954. This marked Japan’s government-to-government economic 
cooperation for the first time with developing countries. Beginning with its 
ODA17 loan to India in 1958, Japan has expanded and diversified its ODA 
as its economy grew stronger in the mid-1960s, leading to the start of its 
general grant aid in 1969. Beginning from 1978, Japan diversified its ODA 
in terms of aid sectors (this included the consideration for Basic Human 
Needs (BHN) and human resources development in addition to economic 
infrastructure) and further expanded its geographical distribution involving 
assistance towards countries in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and 
Pacific regions. On 30 June 1992, Japan adopted its ODA Charter focusing 
more towards direct threats to an individual from the perspective of human 
security ensuring human dignity is maintained at all stages, from the conflict 
stage to the reconstruction and development stages. Japan’s determination to 
denounce war and the remorse of its past military aggression has not only 
brought it closer to supporting the idea of human security but also actively 
participating in the cause of international human security initiatives under its 
pragmatic cooperation schemes. The development of Japan’s diplomacy under 
the pretext of human security not only fits well with the deeply embedded 
anti-military norm and principles within its society but also addressed the 
dilemma of Japan’s previous war atrocities and aggression. It is a powerful 
tool to demonstrate Japan’s sense of penitence and its strong determination and 
commitment shown under its human security initiatives towards improving its 
ties with the neighboring countries that it had once colonized.
In the context of shaping a favorable geostrategic environment, 
Japan’s aggressive pursuit of international human security has played a vital role 
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from the perspective of cultivating trust among members of the international 
community on the grounds of promoting friendly relations and people-
to-people exchanges with other countries. It has been used as an important 
diplomatic tool to protect Japan’s national interest since its inception; driven 
by political motivations to rebuild disrupted political and economic relations 
with Asian countries. In addition, active participation in international human 
security initiatives has also enhanced Japan’s presence within the international 
community and had further strengthened Japan’s standing in the international 
arena. According to Shinoda,Japan faces constraints in its international 
cooperation concerning traditional security matters due to its pacifist 
constitutional and historical disadvantages.18 Therefore, human security has 
proven to be an important instrument for Japan to compensate for its weakness 
in the traditional security field. This is evident in Japan’s leadership role in 
the economic development of the region under the “flying geese pattern of 
development”. The leadership role of Japan in this regard has been the catalyst 
of the global power shift to Asia.19
Japan aggressive pursuit of the international human security would 
also benefit the nation in a number of ways. It helps to create a favorable 
international environment, particularly since Japan relies on other countries 
for resources and food while depending on international peace for its security. 
It has also proven to be meaningful when Japan dealt with important bilateral 
relations. For instance, Japan concluded the Agreement on Economic and 
Technical Cooperation with Saudi Arabia in 197520which had not only 
further strengthened its bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia but has also 
resolved its oil supply shortage due to the First Oil Crisis in 1973. Japan’s 
efforts in the field of human security also help in ensuring its own security 
and prosperity, particularly the revitalization of its economy in the context 
of the spillover effects arising from the dynamic growth of developing and 
emerging countries. In the case of the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s, 
Japan swiftly intervened through its “New Miyazawa Initiative” to assist Asian 
countries in overcoming their economic difficulties and to contribute to the 
stability of the international financial market in the region. This initiative, 
directly or indirectly, served the interests of Japan, for whom Asian countries 
are important partners for trade and investments.
Meanwhile, in the context of threat perceptions, Japan’s national 
security strategy has traditionally been influenced by two main factors. The 
first is the changing geostrategic environment coupled with an equally complex 
international context that contributed to Japan perceiving itself as being 
extremely vulnerable to external threats. The second factor relates to domestic 
policies that have been polarized by two main debates, the revival of Japan’s 
past military capacity versus the preservation of the post-war Japan pacifist 
choice as enshrined in the country’s constitution. From a strategic perspective, 
these two factors have determined Japan’s security policy direction based on 
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the security dilemma brought about by the number of perceived threats that 
led to Japan utilizing its international human security diplomacy as a means 
to justify its action of exerting military elements into its security posture. 
Among the external factors that pose critical threats to Japan are the Japan-
U.S. alliance, the rise of China, and North Korea’s military provocations.21
According to Kawashima22and Samuels23, U.S. is the key pillar of 
Japan’s national security. Thus, Washington’s stance and policies in East Asia 
would have a direct impact on Japan’s security environment and its leadership 
threat perception. The deepening of Japan-U.S. alliance lies in Japan’s 
support towards the continuation of the U.S.-led international order. The U.S. 
expectation is that any shifts in the U.S.-led international and regional systems 
in which Japan has been so firmly embedded should reflect a similar counter-
reaction from Japan. Given the fact that Japan has no genuine alternative allies, 
it is caught in a classical alliance dilemma between abandonment (the ally 
defects during the crisis) and entrapment (the ally forces involvement in crisis). 
Although Japan is still strongly committed to its UN-oriented foreign policies 
with a strong inclination towards human security initiatives,24 has rightly 
observed that the expectation of the U.S. in its alliance is focused towards 
Japan as a nation that could exercise its right to collective self-defense, playing 
a complementary role to the U.S.’s agenda and its foreign policy objectives.25
Against this expectation, Japan inability to assume a greater share 
of responsibility in the alliance has brought about uncertainty in the U.S. 
motivation to sustain the same level of commitment towards the alliance.26 
This condition posed a challenge for policymakers of contemporary Japan in 
the context of the Japan-U.S. alliance. The big question now is how to pursue a 
more mature Japan-U.S. alliance whereby Japan is less dependent on; while at 
the same time being treated as equal and less deferential, to the U.S.
When discussing the rise of China there two main issues that generate 
threat and peril among the Japanese leadership, China’s military build-up and 
its projection towards territorial expansionism. According to Bitzinger,China 
spent USD10 billion on its defense budget in 1997.27 In 2015 the budget rose 
to USD145 billion, funding a rapid modernization of China’s armed forces 
that are slowly narrowing the military gap with the Japan-U.S. alliance. This 
surge coincides with China’s increased assertiveness over its territorial and 
maritime claims, which puts it at loggerheads with Japan and much of the rest 
of Asia. Japan is wary of China’s perceived intention in changing the Asian 
status quo in its favor, and that it will rely on economic leverage and military 
force to achieve its ambitions. Under its new clout, becoming the regional 
hegemon is eminently sensible from China’s standpoint. However, this is not 
in the interest of Japan or the U.S. Although this security competition might 
not lead to a wider war could potentially lead to armed conflict in the East and 
South China seas.
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Concurrently, there is a notion within Japan that the nation’s economic 
interdependent with China could prevent potential conflicts between their two 
countries from occurring. Nevertheless, based on the experience of Japanese 
businesses in China, they had come to learn that such hope is just a wishful 
thinking. Chinese nationalism is so powerful that if a crisis breaks out, there 
may be great pressure from nationalist sentiment from below in China on the 
leaders to rise against Japan. This is evident in the incident of 2012 where 
hundreds of Japanese businesses had to shut down their operations throughout 
China due to the widespread and increasingly violent demonstrations across 
China protesting Tokyo’s decision to acquire the Senkaku Islands from their 
private owner.28On the other hand, the hope for a solution under the rule of 
law through international institutions, and nurturing a web of exchanges and 
confidence-building measures within more robust regional security architecture 
were to no avail as China would not obey the rules when they do not think it’s 
in their interest. China has demonstrated this with its establishment of its Air 
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea. This also included 
its rejection of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling (in the case brought 
to the court by the Philippines) that Beijing had violated the Philippines’ 
sovereign rights in the South China Sea.
The same constraints that Japan faces in dealing with the rise of 
China also weigh heavily on how it should respond to North Korea’s rapidly 
advancing nuclear weapon program. Japan’s policymakers have had an 
increasingly stronger reaction to North Korea’s military provocations since 
the 1990s. North Korea’s numerous missile and nuclear tests, coupled with 
bilateral tensions over its incursions into Japanese territorial waters, and the 
abductions of Japanese citizens has made North Korea Japan’s most prominent 
threat.29Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines for its fiscal year 2005 
clearly declared North Korea as Japan’s top security anxiety, even apparently 
relegating China to a secondary position. The document refers to North Korea 
as a “major de-stabilizing factor” for regional and international security; 
whereas China’s military modernization is simply referred to as requiring 
“careful attention.”30
Today, North Korea’s nuclear threat and its provocative behavior have 
grown into an unprecedented, critical, and imminent level. In 2016 alone, North 
Korea conducted its nuclear tests twice, on 6 January 2016 and 9 September 
2016 respectively. Subsequently, its sixth nuclear test held on 3 September 
2017 has detonated far more destructive power than the atomic bombs dropped 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II. The tremors caused by the 
test could be felt as far as South Korea and China. On 15 September 2017, 
North Korea tested intermediate range ballistic missile that flew over Japan 
before landing in the northern of Pacific Ocean. The missile test follows the 
release of a statement issued by the North Korean State News Agency(KCNA), 
which threatened that the “four islands of the Japanese archipelago should be 
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sunken into the sea by the nuclear bomb of Juche”.
Nevertheless, the most important factor of North Korea’s provocative 
acts towards Japan is the continual tests it had exerted on the solidarity of 
the Japan-U.S. alliance, undermining the very foundation of Japan’s post-war 
security. Hughes observed that Japan’s compromise of its pacifist principles 
by taking part in the U.S.-led “war on terror” through the dispatch of its SDF 
troops to Iraq between 2004-2006, can in large part be interpreted as the need 
to strengthen the solidarity of its alliance in responding to North Korea nuclear 
threat.31
Under the UN’s R2P doctrine, humanitarian intervention has been the 
object of intense debate involving diverging positions at the United Nations. 
It gained currency particularly in the 1990s’ when the world was taken aback 
by the outbreak of mass-scale killings and humanitarian disasters in Somalia, 
Rwanda, and Bosnia, where the international community had been seen as 
too slow in taking decisive and effective action to protect civilians at risk in 
these countries. At the heart of this occurrence lies the tension between two 
conflicting fundamental principles of international law on state’s sovereignty, 
namely the prohibition on the use of force and the obligation to respect and 
protect human rights. In December 2001, the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) released its report on the concept 
of R2P, outlining its three components, namely the “Responsibility to Prevent”, 
“Responsibility to React” and “Responsibility to Rebuild”. The Commission 
proposed the answer to the question of “when” is it appropriate for states to 
take coercive actions (i.e. economic sanction, military intervention etc.) against 
another state by shifting the understanding of state sovereignty. The report 
underscored that in situations where states were proving unable, or unwilling, 
to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity within their own territory; their right to sovereignty 
should be discarded to allow interveners to protect their populations under 
threat. The doctrine on R2P was endorsed by all the member states of the UN at 
the 2005 World Summit held from 14 to 16 September 2005 at United Nations 
Headquarters in New York. It has since, occupies an important space within the 
UN through reports of the Secretary-General of the UN and the resolutions of 
the UN Security Council (UNSC).
As the second largest contributor to the UN budget32 after the U.S., 
Japan is expected to play a role in implementing the R2P. Japan, given its 
emphasis on human security’s non-military approach, faces a challenge of 
responding to R2P advocates and critics. Supporting R2P might signal that 
Japan is abandoning its post-World War II pacifism while opposing the new 
security doctrine could weaken Japan’s position in UN diplomacy. It could also 
sideline Japan’s strengths in capacity building that has, for quite some time, 
allowed it to remain within its comfort zone in its international participation. 
Consequently, Japan took the compromised position of ‘passively’ supporting 
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the World Summit adoption of R2P. However, according to Samuels (2007), 
over the last decade, Japan political scene has been dominated by revisionist 
policy-makers that rose from the nationalist agendas led by factions within the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). They view the global normalization of R2P 
as opening the window of opportunity for Japan to conduct a more active role 
in fulfilling its responsibility to respond collectively in a timely and decisive 
manner that extends beyond non-military activities. From that perspective, R2P 
creates a legitimate basis for Japan to utilize its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) 
more widely and comprehensively to participate in international collective 
defense operations.  This is consistent with the longstanding revisionist agenda 
of normalizing Japan’s military function and amendment of Article 9 of the 
Constitution that constrains Japan’s security posture.
The Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) victory in 2012 elections saw 
Shinzo Abe regaining the post of Prime Minister, which he had already held 
briefly in 2006-2007. The LDP’s electoral agenda under Abe was based on 
several ambitious, and in part unprecedented, political initiatives. It aimed 
at, among others, giving new impetus to the stagnant Japanese economy, 
revising the role of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and reinforcing 
Japan’s international status and national pride. The 2012 electoral campaign 
was marked by one of the most serious foreign policy crises experienced 
by Japan in its post-World War II history. The Senkaku dispute with China 
brought bilateral relations between Japan and China to their lowest point since 
their normalization in 1972. Hostile confrontation with Beijing resulted in a 
burst of nationalism within the Japanese public that saw their resolve towards 
supporting Abe’s agenda. This helped in the LDP’s return to power after a 
three-year intermission. Abe’s political agenda includes an in-depth revision 
and re-interpretation of Japan’s self-imposed restrictions on using the nation’s 
self-defense forces overseas and essentially aimed to “normalize” Japan’s 
security and foreign policy in responding to the growing threats brought about 
by the changing geostrategic environment.
Abe’s pragmatic view towards Japan’s security would mean Japan’s 
international human security diplomacy should include the nation’s ability to 
exercise collective self-defense in light of its own national security needs. With 
Japan’s present financial limitation; it should prudently utilize its financial 
allocation in this regard to bring more visible benefits, or payoffs, to Japan in 
the context of its foreign policy. Japan must distance itself from being seen as 
only taking the role of financially33 supporting the military actions legitimized 
by the UN Security Council resolutions. This could lead towards the global 
community perceiving Japan as a self-centered mercantilist state benefiting 
as a free rider under the UN security umbrella. Most importantly, the nature 
of Japan’s present threats would require a crucial reevaluation of its overall 
defense policy involving the ability to exercise collective self-defense. Hence 
Abe’s efforts towards transforming the nation’s security orientation under the 
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present threats faced by Japan would also lead to an effort to transform its 
international human security diplomacy to remain relevant in this regard.
Towards a Normal Country?
Japan’s foreign policy was traditionally not driven by ideological orientations. 
It mainly aims at ensuring its survival in an international system created and 
dominated by more powerful countries. Japan’s international actions had been 
reactive and hardly ever showed proactive action. Therefore, many scholars 
find it convenient to conclude that the quest for survival still remains the 
hallmark of Japanese foreign policy until today. According to Curtis, Japan 
did not seek to advance its interests by defining the international agenda, 
propagating a particular ideology, or promoting its own vision of the world 
order.34 Rather, Japan takes its external environment as a given and then make 
pragmatic adjustments to keep in step with “the trends of the time”.
On the contrary, the author observed that the perceptions of a 
“reactive” Japan vis-à-vis its foreign policy orientation are somewhat naive, 
perhaps done under shallow analysis. With full awareness of its strengths 
and weaknesses, Japan, on the contrary, has undertaken several proactive 
measures on many occasions since the post-World War II period until now. 
Japan’s success in incorporating the concept of human security into its 
foreign policy implementation is the best example in this regard. The pursuit 
of human security had opened an avenue for Japan to advance towards its 
more than century-old ambition of becoming an international leader. The 
establishment of the CHS and the UNTFHS were steps taken by the Japanese 
government towards assuming a leadership role on an issue that had gained in 
prominence in international politics. Placing both the UNTFHS and the CHS 
under the umbrella of the UN was also a smart move by Japan. It signified 
an understanding of how important integrating the nation into global political 
decision-making within the context of a multilateral framework and being at 
the driver seat in such institutions is.
Under the disadvantage of being a war-defeated nation and 
the mounting challenges it has to face in order to rebuild its devastated 
infrastructures and war-torn society, Japan came back from its total devastation 
in 1945 to become Asia’s economic superpower. Japanese manufacturing has 
set a standard for global production. Japan has brilliantly subdued its brutal 
image of the war by adhering closely to the pacifist constitution forced upon it 
by the allied occupation led by the U.S. Under the projection of its “reactive” 
manner, Japan has shrewdly distanced itself from the burden of military 
spending while utilizing all the time it has on devising sound policies for its 
industrial development and economic advancement. At the same time, it also 
undertook a pro-active role by establishing its overseas development assistance 
under the ambit of ODA. This created a favorable cooperative environment 
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towards its leadership in the field thus gaining a positive reception particularly 
from countries in the region that it had brutally colonized in the past. By 
incorporating human security as part of its foreign policy formulation under 
its human security diplomacy, Japan has again made a pro-active step by 
positioning human security as the cornerstone of its international cooperation 
in the 21st century. The success of Japan’s leadership on this front is evident 
in the high expectation of then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s towards 
its potential and capability in human security initiatives as he expressed how 
he was “heartened to see the commitment by Japan to continue playing its 
leadership role”.35
Human security was a concept that came in handy for Japanese 
political leaders at times when Japan needed to be seen as “unambitious” 
militarily and reactive in its political affairs, in the way prescribed by the 
Yoshida Doctrine. In its search for prestige and global standing, it is necessary 
for Japan to escape the narrow-minded preoccupation of its relationship with 
the U.S., and human security made this perspective potentially realizable. The 
low politics nature of the human security field offered the prospect of Japanese 
international leadership that would not encroach into the mindset of the U.S. 
prerogative to be the leader and Japan as the follower, as far as international 
security affairs were concerned. It is an area where Japan could act fairly freely 
and in ways that it found fit, without offending the U.S. Pursuing human security 
has enabled Japan to engage in activities devised in Tokyo, not Washington.
At the backdrop of Japan’s foreign policy evolution, this article 
believes that Japan sits on an untapped wealth of soft power reserves. The most 
prominent strategy undertaken by the Japanese policy makers in the formulation 
of its foreign policy since 1945 is how it managed to put forth a positive 
image of Japan as a philanthropic country with noble objectives of making 
the world a better place by assisting the development of countries throughout 
the world through its ODA mechanism. This effort succeeded in subduing its 
past war-time negative image and changed it into a positive outlook of Japan 
as a peace-loving nation. This strategy was further strengthened when Japan 
played a leadership role in the realm of human security with its human security 
diplomacy. Japan, through its human security diplomacy, has moved towards 
assuming a proactive role in the security affairs of Southeast Asia in the areas 
of multilateral security dialogues, disaster relief provision, and combating 
piracy, among others. As the Southeast Asian countries becoming more willing 
to have Japan assume a security role in the region, these proactive initiatives 
by Japan have contributed to the positive development of Japan-Southeast 
Asia relations. This has resulted in the heightened trust and confidence levels 
towards Japan.
Nonetheless, in ensuring its survival with the challenges and threats 
brought about by the ever-changing geostrategic environment, Japan cannot 
run away from the reality that it would have to deal with its traditional security 
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affairs sooner or later. Imminent threats such as the rise of China and China’s 
willingness to project its military power over its territorial claim, the potential 
escalation of Japan’s maritime territorial disputes with its surrounding 
neighbors, and the growing threat of nuclear attack by North Korea cannot be 
dealt under Japan’s condition as an abnormal country. Neither can the systemic 
pressure towards the structural change in its security posture in the forms of 
the U.S.’s pressure (for Japan to support it in term of military involvement to 
ensure the functioning of their alliance) and the UN’s expectation (for Japan 
to play a greater role in its humanitarian interventions) be dealt with in a 
satisfactory manner either. Being a pragmatic leader, Abe realized that Japan 
would have to face the most difficult process of its foreign policy orientation. It 
needs to formulate a long-term strategy for Japan towards becoming a normal 
state. Under these circumstances, Abe would have to utilize Japan’s soft power 
mechanisms toward this end, and one of the potential vehicles for Japan to 
travel smoothly along that road is through the transformation of its human 
security diplomacy.
A significant reason that allows Japan to utilize human security 
diplomacy as a platform for its security strategy transformation is its proven 
track record over the years in changing the Southeast Asian countries’ 
perceptions towards Japan. Research has shown that voices once critical of 
Japanese participation in the political/security sphere in Southeast Asia have 
lessened.36For instance, former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad 
in his speech delivered at a welcoming dinner during the official visit by then 
Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa to Malaysia on 14 January 1993 
stated that “…The decision of the Japanese Government to send its troops 
on peace-keeping mission to Cambodia under the United Nations’ auspices 
was indeed historic. Malaysia wholeheartedly welcomes the decision and 
hopes that Japan would participate fully in the peace-keeping activities of the 
United Nations.”Mahathir & Ishihara also clearly state that, “…We believe 
rising nationalism in Japan is just a wake-up call for the new generation of 
Japan…” concerning the subject of rising nationalism in Japan.37 Another vital 
yet controversial comment that insinuated support for Japan’s effort towards 
becoming a normal country came from that of the Philippines President of 
Senate Blas F. Oplethat who stated, “…Japan should seriously consider 
arming itself with nuclear weapons...my own guess is that it’s just a matter of 
time”.38
The multi-dimensional nature of the concept of human security also 
presents another compelling reason. Since its inception, Japan had partially 
participated in the non-traditional security issues under the pretext of “freedom 
of want”. This emphasized the importance of economic development and 
provision for basic human need. Japan’s approach has been shaped by its ad-
hoc programs focusing on economic development and community building 
under its ODA. On the other hand, although a human security strategy is 
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basically a non-military and non-coercive approach, one cannot reject the 
need to recognize that various factors of violence, power, and a coercive order 
originating from the spread of terrorism and endless conflicts exist in the world 
today. There are situations where states were unable or unwilling to protect 
their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity within their own territory, and that it would be the responsibility of 
the international community’s intervention to put the stop to such aggression. 
This is another aspect of human security concept that falls under the “freedom 
from fear” context that requires the purview of military and coercive measures 
such as economic sanctions. This concept has also been pursued and defined 
under the UN doctrine of R2P. This is the part that lacked Japan’s participation 
and could be an ideal justification for Japan in dealing with its constitutional 
constraints to allow for greater participation of its SDF’s in UN humanitarian 
interventions.
In order to realize this, Abe has brilliantly formulated and introduced 
Japan’s “pro-active contribution to peace” as the basic principle of its national 
security strategy to be incorporated under Japan’s international human security 
diplomacy. The principle was included in Japan’s Cabinet decision on the 
Development Cooperation Charter dated 10 February 2015 as it commemorates 
the 60th Anniversary of its ODA that reads, “…Japan and the international 
community are at a major crossroads. In this new era, Japan must strongly lead 
the international community, as a nation that contributes even more proactively 
to securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community from 
the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle 
of international cooperation...” It underscored Japan’s commitment to further 
strengthened collaboration with other countries under the ambit of the UN. 
Perhaps the most glaring feature of Abe’s security policy as compared to 
that of his predecessors is that his policy has departed from relying primarily 
on Japan’s various forms of financial assistance. The policy has now slowly 
encroached into the realm of Japanese military contribution in the context of 
its human security diplomacy that emphasized upholding the principle of the 
“freedom from fear”. This principle requires coercive measures in securing 
international peace and stability.
Conclusion
Abe promised to change Japan upon returning to the office to lead his 
second administration in 2012. Looking at his term thus far and his efforts 
to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance, revise his country’s security policies, 
and pursue difficult economic reforms, Abe has already proven to be one of 
Japan’s most transformative premiers. Perhaps, more than anything else, he 
has drawn attention for his successful effort to pass a package of security-
related bills under the process of reinterpreting Article 9 of the Constitution. 
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Given the changes in the security environment, it is essential for Japan to 
explain in advance to its citizens how they plan to maintain peace and stability 
and to protect them, both during peacetime and in cases of emergencies. Long-
term security strategies must also be explained to other countries to avoid 
unfounded misunderstanding on specific policies and to promote bilateral, as 
well as multilateral, cooperation. Abe has done exactly that by transforming 
its human security diplomacy into a proactive contribution to peace based on 
international cooperation.
Under the newly transformed human security diplomacy, Abe 
established Japan’s first ever National Security Strategy (NSS) on 17 December 
2017 to address the worsening security environment surrounding the country. 
These contemporary security challenges have evolved beyond the defense of 
territorial integrity, involving terrorism, piracy, cyber-attacks, energy resources, 
space, climate change, pandemics, failed states, international crime networks, 
and the illegal trafficking of arms and narcotics, to name just a few. The new 
interconnected, unpredictable and diversified in nature insecurity threats 
demand a more sophisticated, comprehensive, and integrated response, that 
could not be effectively done under Japan’s condition as an abnormal country. 
In facing these security threats, one has to have both a comprehensive hard and 
soft security approach in order to build a resilient society. This requires the 
strengthening of Japan’s own military capabilities, changing the Constitution 
to allow more flexibility on security policies, broadening the scope of the 
alliance for regional and global challenges, and expanding security ties with 
other like-minded nations.
Even though the 1990s was a “Lost Decade” for Japan in an economic 
sense, this article finds that it was a period of major transformation for Japan’s 
security policy. Beginning with its exemplary leadership under its human 
security diplomacy, Japan since then has steadily moved towards the re-
institutionalization of its security policy in full public view. The significant 
milestone would be the establishment of the nation’s Ministry of Defense on 
9 January 2007, taking its stature from an agency to a full-fledged Ministry. 
Japan’s newfound “leadership” originating from its aggressive human security 
initiatives in the 1990s reflects years of relentless efforts by its politicians and 
policy makers in integrating autonomy and prestige for the first time in Japan’s 
modern history. Without a doubt, this process is further continued and gain its 
momentum under Abe’s “proactive contribution to peace” policy. In addition to 
leading Japan towards becoming a normal state, Abe’s proactive contribution to 
peace stressed on Japan role as a responsible nation with its security check and 
balances that would repeal the negative notion of “Japan’s remilitarization”. In 
the era of globalization and the face of new threats and challenges, becoming 
“normal’ is prerequisite for Japan to ensure its own security while at the same 
time “weave” itself into the fabric of collaboration with the international 
community in ensuring sustainable world peace, stability, and resilience.
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